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TOO NARROW TO BE TRUE: MONTANA'S
INTERPRETATION OF DEPENDENT RELATIVE
REVOCATION
Timothy D. Geiszler
One purpose of the law of wills is to discover and make effective
the intent of the decedent in the distribution of his property.' People
normally set forth the scheme for the distribution of their property
in a will. Wills must conform to certain statutory standards to be
valid and enforceable.2 A problem arises when the will sufficiently
explains the decedent's desires, but is denied probate because it
fails to comply with the requirements mandated by statute. Judicial
responses to this problem are many. The object of this note is to
focus on one solution, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation,
and its applicability in Montana as demonstrated by In re Patten.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCTRINE
A. The Traditional Doctrine
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation (DRR) is a rule
of presumed intent' used in certain circumstances to set aside a
revocation of an earlier will. According to the doctrine, if a testator
revokes or destroys his old will and substitutes another which fails
for any reason, a rebuttable presumption arises that he would prefer
to have his property distributed according to the earlier will than
according to intestate succession statutes. DRR complements the
general presumption that one would prefer to die testate. 5
Generally, three elements must exist before DRR can be ap-
plied. They are: (1) revocation of a valid will by physical act' as part
of a plan to make a new will; (2) preparation of a second will con-
taining a plan of distribution similar to that of the revoked will; and
(3) invalidation of the second will. To avoid the unexpected intes-
1. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA] § 72-1-102(2)(b) (1978) (for-
merly codified at REVISED CONES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], §
91A-1-102(2)(b)).
2. See MCA § 72-1-101 et seq. (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-1-101
et seq.).
3. - Mont. __, 587 P.2d 1307 (1978).
4. See, e.g., Estate of Lubbe, 142 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1962).
5. See T.E. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS [hereinafter cited as ATKINSON] 814 (2d ed. 1953).
6. An exception to the general requirement of revocation by physical act is the rare
occurrence of a subsequent valid will which revokes the earlier will and demonstrates a
reliance on a mistake of law or fact. For example, "Since my children are all dead, I hereby
revoke all my earlier wills and declare this will to be .... " In this situation DRR can be
applied to set aside the revocation if any child is still alive. ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 459.
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tacy in this situation, proponents of the earlier will may argue that
based on the doctrine of DRR, the first will was not revoked
absolutely. Recall that revocation consists of an act coupled with an
intent to revoke. A court applies DRR when its examination reveals
an intent different from an absolute intent to revoke. Particularly,
the court finds an intent to revoke coupled with a reliance on the
validity of the later will. The court often labels this intent
"conditional."7 Stated succinctly, when a testator substantially re-
peats the same dispositive plan in a new will, revocation of the old
will is deemed inseparably related to and dependent upon the legal
effectiveness of the new one.8
The court, in presuming a conditional intent, engages in a legal
fiction. Because a decedent rarely entertains doubts as to the valid-
ity of his latest will, his subjective intent is to revoke the first will
absolutely. Nevertheless, the courts find grounds for conditional
revocation. In applying DRR, courts may refer to the revocation as
conditional or based on mistake. In either instance, the testator
revoked the first will on the assumption that the second will was
valid.'
Similarity between the dispositive schemes of the two wills is
an essential element of DRR.10 Indeed, it is this similarity that is
the basis for the presumption that the testator would prefer the
earlier will to intestacy. Similarity of dispositive schemes of the two
wills indicates that the testator is partially satisfied with the earlier
will." For example, if the first will leaves the bulk of the estate to
Peter and the second leaves the bulk of the estate to Paul, there is
no evidence implying that the testator, given the invalidity of the
second will, would still prefer Peter to take the bulk of the estate.
DRR therefore would not be applicable in such a case. On the other
hand, if the first and second wills had both devised the bulk of the
estate to Peter and only minor differences existed between the two
wills, it is reasonable to infer that the testator would want the first
will to be valid. This is especially true if intestate succession provi-
sions would serve significantly to reduce or negate Peter's interest.
Thus, the standard the court should use in determining the appli-
7. See, e.g., Flanders v. White, 142 Or. 375, 18 P.2d 823 (1933).
8. In re Kaufman, 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831, 834 (1945).
9. DRR is not suited for all instances of mistake, but is limited to situations where the
mistake is connected with a subsequent dispositive attempt. In Emenecker's Estate, 218 Pa.
369, 67 A. 701 (1907), the testatrix destroyed her will believing a neighbor's incorrect advice
that the will was invalid. She expressed an intention to make a new will at the next conven-
ient time, but never did. The court refused to apply DRR because there was no subsequent
attempted disposition. Id. at 372, 67 A. at 702. This case exemplifies the limited scope of DRR
as a means of effectuating intent in cases of mistaken revocation.
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cability of DRR is whether the testator would have preferred the
earlier will to intestacy.'
2
B. Extensions of the Traditional Doctrine
Courts have applied DRR to instances of partial revocation and
revocation by subsequent writing. In cases of partial revocation,
DRR may be applied when the testator attempts to alter his exe-
cuted will by changing the name of a beneficiary, the amount of a
legacy, or some other provision of the will. 3 For example, if Testator
crosses out John's name on an executed will and writes in Mary's,
the addition of Mary's name is ineffective for lack of proper execu-
tion. 14 In Montana, the crossing out of John's name would constitute
a partial revocation.' 5
Courts in other jurisdictions have taken two approaches to this
situation. Some courts apply DRR mechanically on the premise that
the testator would not prefer the revocation to be effective unless
the modification is enforceable.' 6 To use the example above, if the
addition of Mary's name is ineffective, the court would automati-
cally set aside the revocation of John's devise. Other courts, using
a more intent-oriented approach, do not apply DRR unless the court
infers from the will that the testator would have preferred the revo-
cation to stand even if the substitution is ineffective. 7 Using the
intent approach, the court would enforce the original bequest if it
had been increased by an unattested change, but would not enforce
the bequest if it were significantly decreased. 8 Just as DRR is not
applicable when two wills have substantially different dispositive
schemes, it also is not applicable when the difference between the
original bequest and the invalid addition implies dissatisfaction
with the original bequest.
DRR has also been extended to situations in which the earlier
will is expressly revoked by a valid subsequent will which is par-
12. See, Warren, Dependent Relative Revocation, 33 HARV. L. REV. 337 (1920). When
revocation of the earlier will is by physical act, parol evidence is admitted to determine
whether the testator had conditional intent at the time of the revocation. The admissibility
of this evidence is helpful since the proponent of DRR must show the testator relied on the
validity of the second will. The availability of this evidence, however, is limited since most
wills are destroyed or modified in private. Id. at 347. In Montana, statements made by the
testator at any time other than execution or revocation are normally inadmissible. In re
Colbert's Estate, 31 Mont. 461, 78 P. 971 (1904).
13. ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 458.
14. See MCA § 72-2-302 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-502).
15. MCA § 72-2-321(2) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-507(2)).
16. ATKINSON, supra note 5, at 458.
17. See, e.g., Ruel v. Harding, 90 N.H. 240, 6 A.2d 753 (1939).
18. Id. This latter approach is more consistent with the rationale of DRR in that it
focuses on the testator's intent.
1979] 339
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tially ineffective. For example, a devise in a later valid will, revoking
all prior wills, might be ineffective in Montana because the devisee
was a witness to the will." Another example is a charitable bequest
denied effect by a mortmain statute."' In In re Kaufman,2 the testa-
tor redrafted an earlier will changing only the executor. The second
will, like the first, left the residue of the estate to a New York
church. Because the second will was executed within thirty days of
Kaufman's death, the bequest was barred by California's mortmain
statute.22 The second will included a valid revoking clause. Since the
earlier will contained the same residuary devise to the church and
was executed more than thirty days before the testator's death, the
court applied DRR and allowed the church to take under the earlier
will.23
I. In re Patten
Until recently, the Montana Supreme Court had not considered
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. Arguably, the doc-
trine is part of the common law,2' and the Montana Uniform Pro-
bate Code does not prohibit its application." The purpose clause of
the code provides:
(1) This code shall be liberally construed and applied to pro-
mote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this code are:
(b) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent
in the distribution of his property .... 11
The code further states that the testator's intent should always
control construction. 27 The law of Montana therefore seems amen-
able to the adoption of DRR. In Re Patten2 1 presented the first
opportunity for the Montana Supreme Court to consider the doc-
trine.
19. MCA § 72-2-305(3) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-505(3)).
20. See, e:g., MCA § 72-11-334 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91-142). This
statute prohibits a charitable devise to the extent it exceeds one third of the estate if the
devise was executed within thirty days of the testator's death.
21. 25 Cal. 2d 854, 155 P.2d 831 (1945).
22. CAL. PROB. CODE § 41 (West).
23. 155 P.2d at 834.
24. See MCA §§ 1-1-108 and 109 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 12-103
and 104).
25. MCA § 72-2-321 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-507).
26. MCA § 72-1-102 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-1-102).
27. MCA § 72-2-501 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-603).
28. - Mont. -, 587 P.2d 1307 (1978).
[Vol. 40
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Ella Patten executed two wills. The earlier will, dated Novem-
ber 25, 1968, devised $5,000 to her son, Robert, who was designated
executor; $5,000 to a son of Robert; $2,500 to a daughter of Robert;
and the remainder of the estate to her son, Donald. The estate was
valued in excess of $200,000. The will was executed properly in the
office of Mrs. Patten's attorney. She kept the original will and the
attorney retained a copy. On July 6, 1970, Mrs. Patten drafted a
second will which expressly revoked all former wills. The second will
differed from the first in that the second will made no provision for
Mrs. Patten's grandchildren and substituted Donald as executor.
The two sons took the same bequests: $5,000 to Robert and the
remainder to Donald.
Ella Patten made the second will without the assistance of an
attorney. But for the deletion of bequests to her grandchildren and
the change of executor in the second will, the two wills were identi-
cal in the distribution of the property. In addition, both wills had
the same punctuation and used three witnesses instead of the two
required by statute.2 This later will was denied probate for lack of
proper execution*30 Because the earlier will was in the possession of
the testatrix and was not found at her death, a rebuttable presump-
tion arose that she destroyed that will with the intent to revoke.3'
Donald Patten commenced an action requesting the probate of
the first will on the theory that DRR served to negate the revocation
of the first will. The district court refused to apply DRR, and Don-
ald appealed. The issue facing the Montana Supreme Court was
whether DRR could set aside this revocation. In deciding the case
the court recognized DRR as part of Montana's common law, but
refused to apply the doctrine to the facts .2
B. Application of the Doctrine
Two of the three elements requisite to the application of DRR
were easily satisfied in Patten. Recall the first element requires that
the earlier will be revoked by physical act as part of a scheme to
make a second will. In this case, revocation by physical act is satis-
fied by the presumption that a will in the control of the testatrix
and not found at her death was destroyed by her with the intent to
revoke. The similarity of punctuation and phraseology between the
29. MCA § 72-2-302 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-502).
30. Patten v. Patten, 171 Mont. 399, 558 P.2d 659 (1976).
31. See Estate of Newman, 165 Mont. 15, 215 P.2d 800 (1974).
32. - Mont. at _, 587 P.2d at 1309.
33. See note 31, supra.
1979]
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two wills implies that one was drafted from the other. The revoca-
tion of the earlier will was therefore so connected with the execution
of the later will that the two acts reasonably can be considered to
be part of the same plan or scheme. The second required element is
that the later will be unenforceable. As mentioned above, Ella Pat-
ten's 1970 will was denied probate for want of proper execution."
The final element, and the one unsatisfied in the view of the
court, requires the second will to have a similar dispositive scheme.
Since DRR is based on the presumption that the testator would
prefer the earlier will to intestacy evidence of a radical difference
in the dispositive schemes, of the two wills negates the presumption.
In Patten, the Montana Supreme Court determined that DRR was
inapplicable because the dispositive schemes were too different.35
The court based this finding on Mrs. Patten's failure to provide
anything in her second will for her grandchildren. It gave no indica-
tion, however, of what would constitute sufficient similarity. One
questions whether the court's demand for similarity is really a de-
mand that the two wills be identical. To apply DRR in Montana the
proponent will have to convince the court that reasonable similarity
of dispositive schemes, coupled with the presumption that one pre-
fers to die testate, is sufficient to invoke dependent relative revoca-
tion. Patten provides little assistance to this task.
This author can conceive of two methods to measure similarity
of dispositive schemes. One method is to view the number of be-
quests changed in relation to the total number of bequests. Disre-
garding the change of executor,3" Mrs. Patten deleted two of the
original four bequests. An alteration of half the bequests in a will
tends to support the finding of dissimilarity."7 A second and more
accurate method to measure similarity is to evaluate the changes
made in view of their effect on the final distribution of the estate.
Using this approach, Robert's $5,000 legacy represents 2.5 percent
of the $200,000 estate. Robert's percentage is the same in both wills.
The deletion of the two bequests in the later will only effects Don-
ald's share, which increases from 93.25 percent of the total estate
in the 1968 will to 97.5 percent in the 1970 will. The result of this
second method of analysis is that the difference in the dispositive
schemes of the two wills affects only 4.25 percent of the total estate.
Two wills made by the same person will almost always be dif-
ferent in some way. It must be remembered that the purpose of
34, See note 30, supra.
35. __ Mont. at __, 587 P.2d at 1310.
36. For the purpose of measuring similarity of dispositive schemes, this analysis disre-
gards a change of executor, which is not a bequest in the true sense of the word.
. 37. See, e.g., Estate of Lubbe, 142 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1962).
[Vol. 40
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examining the similarity of dispositive schemes is not to determine
whether the testator would prefer the earlier will to the later will,
but rather, would he prefer the earlier will to intestacy. Since the
testator rarely considers the choice between intestacy and the ear-
lier will, any determination will be founded on some degree of specu-
lation. The cautious route is to uphold the revocation of the earlier
will because the testator in fact revoked it. The danger of the cau-
tious route is that it may thwart the intention of the decedent. In
light of the circumstances in Patten, it appears that the Montana
court was excessively cautious at the expense of the testator's in-
tent.
C. A Puzzling Interpretation
In interpreting the doctrine of dependent relative revocation,
the Montana Supreme Court stated that DRR "can only be applied
where the evidence of the testator's intent is clear and convincing. '3
This statement is confusing because DRR is a doctrine of presumed
intent. The court's own opinion defines DRR by saying:
[I]f a testator, having made a will and desiring to make a new one,
cancels the first will preparatory to making the second and there-
after fails lawfully to execute the same or make therein an invalid
disposition of his property, it will be presumed that he preferred
the old will to intestacy, and the old will was intended to be depen-
dent upon making of a new one as a substitute for the old one. 39
If a proponent of an earlier will can show clear and convincing
evidence of the testator's conditional intent, there is no need for the
presumption. The court's interpretation of DRR is so limiting that
it precludes the application of the doctrine in Montana in practi-
cally all instances.
The court supports its interpretation by referring to two cases,
Roberts v. Fisher0 and In re Moo's Estate,4 which state that a
showing of conditional revocation is required to apply DRR. Both
cases concern lost wills and involve only one will or will attempt.
There is no reference in either case to a second will. DRR is intro-
duced in these cases only to support an unsuccessful contention of
conditional revocation. These cases do not raise the issue of DRR
because DRR requires the presence of two wills.4" The last case cited
in support of Montana's interpretation is In re Hall,43 which pro-
38. __ Mont. at -, 587 P.2d at 1310.
39. Id. at __, 587 P.2d at 1309 (emphasis added).
40. 230 Ind. 667, 105 N.E.2d 595 (1952).
41. 414 Ill. 54, 110 N.E.2d 194 (1953).
42. See discussion, note 9, supra; Emenecker's Estate, 218 Pa. 369, 67 A. 701 (1907).
43. 7 Wash. App. 341, 499 P.2d 912 (1972). 7
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vides that "a showing of immediate intent to make a new testamen-
tary disposition and of conditional destruction of the original will
are [sic] required to reestablish a destroyed will"44 under DRR.
Hall refers to a second will which was never presented to the court.
The quote is taken from a paragraph discussing the need to show
that the revocation of one will is so connected with the execution
of another that the two acts are part of one plan. Viewed in the
proper context, this rule is valid. After commenting on the lack of
a second will, the court in Hall said that by showing that a second
will was similar to the earlier will, the proponent could provide
circumstantial evidence of a conditional revocation and thus invoke
DRR.45
Ill. CONCLUSION
Although the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of DRR
is extremely narrow, it does not preclude the use of the doctrine in
Montana. DRR conceivably could be applied where the difference
between the two wills consists only of a change in the executor.
Another instance suitable to DRR would be when a bequest is de-
nied effect by operation of Montana's mortmain statute" or by the
rule against a devisee witnessing the execution. 47 The applicability
of DRR to a partial revocation by means of interlineations and
unattested substitution remains unclear. The last situation suitable
to DRR is that rare case where the dispositive schemes of the two
wills are more similar than in Patten.
While Montana has expanded its case law with the adoption of
DRR, the supreme court's extremely narrow interpretation of the
doctrine seems to render its applicability remote at best.
44. Id. at 343, 499 P.2d at 914.
45. Id. While these three cases inappropriately are cited by the Montana Supreme
Court, they also are relied upon inappropriately in 95 C.J.S. Wills § 267 (1957), which
discusses DRR.
46. MCA § 72-11-334 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91-142).
47. MCA § 72-2-305(3) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 91A-2-505(3)).
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